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The Warrant Requirement for Container
Searches and the "Well-Delineated"
Exceptions: The New "Bright Line" Rules
ROBERT A. WAINGER*
In two recent cases, Robbins v. California and New York v.
Belton, the Supreme Court of the United States established
standardized rules for determining when police may conduct a
warrantless search of a closed container seized from an auto-
mobile. The author analyzes these cases and argues that their
holdings do not conform to the policies underlying traditional
exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement.
The author suggests that the Supreme Court will probably
change these rules when it decides United States v. Ross, a case
now pending before the Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
tects "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . ."I The interest that the fourth amendment protects
has been defined as a person's legitimate expectation of privacy.'
To protect this interest, the United States Supreme Court favors
judicial determination of the reasonableness of a search. Although
most warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, the Court has
recognized exceptions to this rule in a few "specifically estab-
* B.S., University of Michigan, 1966; M.D., University of Michigan Medical School,
1969; member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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lished" and "well-delineated" situations.3
Much of fourth amendment jurisprudence has involved bal-
ancing the individual's privacy interest against the countervailing
needs of society. When a person's expectation of privacy is particu-
larly low, or the needs of society are particularly great, courts es-
tablish an exception to the warrant requirement.' The facts and
circumstances of a particular case are usually crucial in determin-
ing whether a given search falls within one of these exceptions.
Further, because every exception to the warrant requirement
invariably impinges on an individual's fourth amendment rights,
courts are often faced with a constitutional "line-drawing process"
in search and seizure cases.
The most common exceptions to the fourth amendment war-
rant requirement are the automobile search,6 the plain view doc-
trine, and the search incident to arrest.8 The outcome of search
and seizure cases often depends on whether a court finds a war-
rantless search constitutional under one of these exceptions. In a
frequently litigated situation, for example, the police stop an auto-
mobile on the road, arrest the driver, and conduct a warrantless
search of a closed container found in the car. This fact pattern
raises several search and seizure issues: First, does the type of
container searched determine whether the fourth amendment pro-
tects its owner's expectation of privacy from warrantless searches?
Second, what is the relationship between the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement and the exceptions to this requirement
carved out by the courts in their "line-drawing process"? Finally,
can courts better protect fourth amendment rights using standard-
ized rules instead of a case-by-case analysis?
In two recent cases, Robbins v. California9 and New York v.
Belton,10 the Supreme Court of the United States attempted to re-
solve these questions. Rather than pursue its usual course of deter-
3. Id. at 357 (plurality opinion).
4. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979). But cf Comment, Tracking
Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461, 1472-77 (1977)
(criticizing the use of a balancing test for determining fourth amendment rights).
5. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 757.
6. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
7. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-71 (1971).
8. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969).
9. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).




mining fourth amendment rights based on the particular facts and
circumstances of a case, the Court established "bright line" rules
that it believed the police and the lower courts could easily under-
stand and apply. This article will review these cases and discuss
the implications of the new rules and their relationship to the rec-
ognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. These standard-
ized rules do not conform to previously "established principles" of
fourth amendment jurisprudence. By granting certiorari in United
States v. Ross," the Court is already beginning to reconsider the
viability of these rules.
II. THE RECENT CASES
In Robbins v. California," California Highway Patrol officers
stopped Robbins for driving erratically. Upon smelling marijuana
smoke in Robbins's station wagon, the officers searched the passen-
ger compartment and discovered marijuana and drug-related para-
phernalia." While they were gathering this evidence, Robbins told
the officers that the object of their search was in the back of the
car.'4 The officers put Robbins in their patrol car and then opened
a recessed luggage compartment inside the station wagon's tailgate.
There they found two fifteen-pound bricks of marijuana, each
wrapped in green opaque plastic.'5
The trial court denied Robbins's motion to suppress the evi-
dence found in the plastic bags, and the jury convicted him of vari-
ous drug offenses." The Supreme Court of the United States, in a
plurality opinion written by Justice Stewart, reversed the convic-
tion and held that the police should not have searched the closed
opaque containers without a warrant, even though they were found
during a lawful search of an automobile.17 In arriving at its deci-
sion, the plurality established two "bright. line" rules. First, the
11. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
386 (1981).
12. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
13. Id. at 422.
14. Id. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 422 & n.1.
16. Id. at 422-23. In an unpublished opinion, the California court of appeal affirmed the
conviction. Id. at 423. The United States Supreme Court vacated this judgment and re-
manded the case for consideration in light of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). The
California Court of Appeals again upheld the search, concluding that Robbins had no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the containers because the officers could infer the contain-
ers' contents from their outer appearance. People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 780 (1980).
17. 453 U.S. at 428.
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fourth amendment protects all closed opaque containers from war-
rantless searches;18 and second, a container taken from an automo-
bile has the same fourth amendment protection as one seized
elsewhere.19
New York v. Belton2 0 involved similar facts. A New York state
patrolman stopped a speeding car in which Belton and three other
men were riding. The officer smelled marijuana and saw an enve-
lope on the floor of the car marked "supergold," which he associ-
ated with marijuana. The officer subsequently discovered that
none of the occupants owned the car or was related to the owner.
After asking the men to step out of the car, the officer arrested
them for possession of marijuana. While searching the passenger
compartment of the vehicle, the officer found marijuana in the en-
velope and discovered cocaine in a zippered pocket of Belton's
jacket which lay on the back seat.2 1
On appeal, the Supreme Court mustered a majority and, in an
opinion written by Justice Stewart, concluded that the warrantless
search of Belton's jacket was constitutional. The Court established
another "bright line" rule, holding that "when a policeman has
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he
may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the pas-
senger compartment of that automobile. ' 22 The officer also may
open and search any closed container which he finds inside that
compartment.23 The Court stated that the passenger compartment
includes the glove compartment and console, but does not include
the trunk.2 4
18. Id. at 426.
19. Id. at 428-29.
20. Id. at 454.
21. Id. at 455-57. The trial court denied Belton's motion to suppress the cocaine. As a
result, he pled guilty to a lesser offense, reserving his right to appeal. The Appellate Divi-
sion of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's order, holding that the
officer's search was justified as an incident to Belton's arrest. People v. Belton, 68 A.D.2d
198, 416 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1979). The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
warrantless search was not incident to arrest because Belton and the other men were in
custody before the search and could not gain access to the seized evidence. 50 N.Y.2d 447,
407 N.E.2d 420, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1980).
22. 453 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
23. Id. at 460-61.
24. Id. at 460 n.4. The Belton Court did not hold that a car's trunk could not be
searched incident to arrest. The Court simply limited its holding to the passenger compart-
ment. Justice Powell, discussing the Belton holding, suggested a distinction between an au-
tomobile's passenger compartment and its trunk: "Immediately preceding the arrest, the
passengers have complete control over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place
weapons or contraband into pockets or other containers as the officer approaches ....
[Vol. 36:115
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The Supreme Court's decision that the warrantless search of
Belton's jacket was constitutional is difficult to reconcile with its
holding that the warrantless search of Robbins's plastic bags was
not. In both Belton and Robbins, the police searched a closed
container found within a car after lawfully stopping the car on the
highway and arresting its occupant. The apparent conflict between
these two cases is even more disturbing when oni considers that
the police officers in Robbins had probable cause to believe that
the seized containers held contraband, while the officer in Belton
did not. One possible explanation is that Robbins and Belton were
argued on different theories. The search incident to arrest excep-
tion was not before the Court in Robbins,2" while the Court consid-
ered only that exception in Belton. Understanding the implications
of Robbins and Belton, therefore, requires a careful analysis of the
general principles applicable to claims of fourth amendment
violations.
III. THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT FOR CONTAINER SEARCHES
Two previous Supreme Court cases recognized that an individ-
ual has a substantially greater expectation of privacy in his per-
sonal luggage than in his automobile. In United States v. Chad-
wick, 6 federal agents had probable cause to believe that a two
hundred-pound, double-locked footlocker contained marijuana.2
The agents watched the defendants claim the footlocker at a rail-
road station, take it to a car, and then load it into the car's trunk.
Before the defendants had closed the trunk or started the car, the
agents arrested them and seized and subsequently searched the
footlocker.28 The Court held that although the footlocker was law-
fully seized, the warrantless search of its contents was an unconsti-
tutional invasion of the defendants' legitimate expectation of
These considerations do not apply to the trunk of the car .... " Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. at 431-32 (Powell, J., concurring).
25. The Robbins Court stated, "In particular, it is not argued that the opening of the
packages was incident to a lawful custodial arrest." 453 U.S. at 429 n.3. The only issue
litigated in Robbins was whether the police required a warrant before opening a sealed
opaque container discovered in the luggage compartment of a station wagon. Id. at 432
(Powell, J., concurring).
26. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
27. The petition for certiorari only raised the question of the constitutionality of the
footlocker search. Consequently, the Court did not decide whether the agents had probable
cause to arrest the defendants. Id. at 5 n.1.
28. Id.'at 3-5.
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privacy.s9
Arkansas v. Sanders"0 extended Chadwick to apply to other
types of luggage. In Sanders police officers acting on a tip from an
informant had probable cause to believe that an unlocked suitcase
contained marijuana."1 The officers observed the defendant pick up
the suitcase at an airport and load it into the trunk of a waiting
cab. The police obtained the cab driver's permission to open the
trunk and subsequently searched the suitcase. The Supreme Court
concluded that the trial court incorrectly denied a motion to sup-
press the evidence obtained in the warrantless search. The Court
reasoned that a suitcase is a common repository for personal ef-
fects invariably associated with a high expectation of privacy.3'
The Court held that, unless the destruction of evidence is likely, a
warrantless search of a suitcase is unconstitutional.
3 3
After Sanders the federal courts of appeals frequently distin-
guished containers that were analogous to luggage from those that
were not. Containers similar to luggage were frequently held to be
repositories of personal effects. Even if the police had lawfully
seized one of these containers, its contents continued to be associ-
ated with independent expectations of privacy that could not be
invaded without a warrant.34
Containers of a less substantial nature than luggage conse-
quently were subject to warrantless searches. Unable to find some
objective or external evidence of an expectation of privacy in these
containers, courts have refused to suppress the incriminating evi-
dence obtained without a warrant." The State of California urged
the Supreme Court to adopt this distinction in Robbins,"' contend-
ing that the fourth amendment protects only privacy interests in
29. Id. at 11.
30. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
31. Id. at 761.
32. Id. at 762.
33. Id. at 764.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980) (tote bag); United
States v. Miller, 608 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1979) (rehearing en banc) (plastic portfolio), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980); United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1979) (brief-
case); United States v. Meier, 602 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1979) (backpack); United States v.
Johnson, 588 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1979) (duffle bag).
35. E.g., United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1980) (plastic bag inside
paper bag); see also United States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1980) (parcel wrapped
in plastic and paper bags); United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1980) (paper
bag).
36. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
[Vol. 36:115
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containers commonly used to carry personal effects.87 Under this
argument, the lawfully seized plastic bags in Robbins's 'car were
unlikely repositories for personal effects and were thus subject to a
warrantless search.
The Robbins plurality rejected this argument, reasoning that
the language of the fourth amendment makes no distinction be-
tween "personal" and "impersonal" effects. The Court observed
that "[o]nce placed within. . . a container, a diary and a dishpan
are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment" because "[wjhat
one person may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper
bag." 8 The plurality was also unable to find any objective criteria
for distinguishing privacy interests associated with different types
of containers.3 9
The state in Robbins also argued that the nature of the defen-
dant's plastic packages permitted the officers to infer that the
packages contained marijuana.40 One of the arresting officers even
testified that he was aware that contraband frequently was trans-
ported in this fashion.4 1 These facts, the state contended, made the
search of Robbins's plastic bags constitutional under an exception
to the warrant requirement suggested in Arkansas v. Sanders:
4'
Not all containers and packages found by police during the
course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of bur-
glar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be
inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some
cases the contents of a package will be open to "plain view,"
thereby obviating the need for a warrant."
37. Id. at 425.
38. Id. at 426 (citing United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981)). In Ross the court held that no distinguishable difference
existed between a paper bag and a leather pouch that the police had seized from the respon-
dent's trunk and searched. For a discussion of Ross, see infra notes 135-46 and accompany-
ing text.
39. 453 U.S. at 426-27. Attempting to distinguish the privacy interest among different
types of containers would be an impossible task for the police and the courts. The police
could not rely on the size of the container, the material from which it was made, or the
manner in which it was sealed in determining whether to obtain a warrant before searching
it. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.) (an banc), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
386 (1981).
40. 453 U.S. at 426-27. The California court of appeal relied on this theory in affirming
Robbins's conviction. See supra note 16.
41. 453 U.S. at 428.
42. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
43. Id. at 764 n.13 (emphasis added).
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The Robbins Court expanded the warrant requirement by re-
jecting the argument that Robbins's plastic packages fell within
this exception. The Court explained that the last sentence of the
exception suggested in Sanders applied to items in an open
container, and that the first part of the exception "is likewise little
more than another variation of the 'plain view' exception."'44 The
nature of a container must do more than intimate its contents to
fall within the Sanders exception; its contents must be "obvious to
an observer."45 Although an open, transparent, or distinctively
shaped container might have satisfied this requirement, the pack-
ages in Robbins's car did not. By acknowledging the Sanders vari-
ation of the plain view doctrine, the Robbins plurality blurred its
otherwise "bright line" rule that the nature of a container does not
affect fourth amendment protection of its owner's interests. e
Other Justices on the Supreme Court agreed with the plural-
ity's first "bright line" rule, and it appears to be a reliable prece-
dent. Justices Blackmun and Stevens favor eliminating distinctions
among different types of containers when determining fourth
amendment rights. 7 Only Justice Powell would continue to use the
nature of the container as a basis for determining its owner's ex-
pectation of privacy. 8 Powell concurred in the Court's judgment
only because he believed the manner in which Robbins had
wrapped and sealed his packages demonstrated that he had a suffi-
cient expectation of privacy in their contents to preclude a war-
44. 453 U.S. at 427. The plain view doctrine allows an officer to seize contraband or
evidence which is in plain view without a warrant. Several restrictions limit the exception.
The officer must have a lawful right to be where he can see the object in plain view. The
nature of the object must be immediately apparent and its discovery inadvertent. Property
cannot be seized under the plain view exception when the officer has prior reason to know
that he will discover evidence during a search. In that situation, the officer must obtain a
warrant. When these criteria are satisfied, an owner has no constitutionally protected expec-
tation of privacy in an exposed object. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66
(1971).
45. 453 U.S. at 428 (emphasis added).
46. The Court failed to explain how an officer should determine whether the container's
contents are sufficiently obvious to permit a warrantless search. For example, only labora-
tory analysis can positively identify a heroin capsule in a clear plastic bag. Yet its identity
may be obvious to a narcotics agent in light of his experience and knowledge of the circum-
stances. The criminal nature of the capsule, however, may not be obvious to an average
citizen. See United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309, 1315 (8th Cir. 1980).
47. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 446-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 434 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell believes that a trial court
should conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant manifested a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in a container. Factors relevant to the decision would be the nature of
the container, the situation in which it was discovered, and whether its owner had taken




IV. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
Unlike the warrant requirement for container searches, the
"automobile exception" has allowed police to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles for over fifty years. The Supreme Court
established the exception in Carroll v. United States6" by holding
that an officer who stops a car on the road with probable cause to
believe that it contains contraband may search the vehicle without
a warrant. The Court reasoned that the inherent mobility of the
automobile is an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless
search. 1
The inherent mobility of the automobile, however, only par-
tially explains the automobile exception. A closed container has
the same mobility as the car in which it is located.51 Unlike a
.container, the automobile is associated with a low expectation of
privacy because "its function is transportation and it seldom serves
as. . .a repository of personal effects. . . .It travels public thor-
oughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view." 3 A car owner's expectation of privacy is diminished further
because the automobile is subject to state regulations and inspec-
tions that often allow police to take it into custody."
In Chambers v. Maroney,55 the police had probable cause to
believe that a car contained loot from a robbery. The police
stopped the car, arrested its occupants, and after taking the vehi-
cle to the police station, searched it. Although the police had both
the car and its occupants in custody, and presumably had time to
obtain a warrant, the Court held that the warrantless search of the
car was constitutional under the automobile exception. The Court
explained its reasoning as follows:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judg-
49. Id. at 429. Robbins's packages were wrapped with clear plastic over an inner layer
of opaque plastic. Each layer was taped closed. Id. at 422 n.1.
50. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
51. Id. at 153.
52. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1977).
53. Id. at 12 .(quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)).
54. 433 U.S. at 11. The Supreme Court has relied increasingly on the diminished expec-
tation of privacy associated with automobiles to allow warrantless vehicle searches. The
Court has upheld searches of immobile vehicles already in police custody even when the
police lacked probable cause to believe that the car contained evidence of a crime. See, e.g.,
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
55. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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ment, only the immobilization of the car should be permitted
until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the "lesser"
intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the
"greater." But which is the "greater" and which the "lesser" in-
trusion is itself a debatable question . . ..
The Court concluded that when a police officer has probable cause
to search a stopped automobile, he may take it to the police station
and search it there. This search is reasonable under the fourth
amendment.
5 7
Individuals predictably associate some parts of a car with a
greater expectation of privacy than others. For example, an auto-
mobile's glove compartment and trunk are closed and frequently
locked. The Supreme Court has failed to make this distinction and
has upheld, under the automobile' exception, the search of various
compartments within a car."' Several United States courts of ap-
peals have relied on the automobile exception to uphold warrant-
less searches of closed containers removed from a car when the na-
ture of the container did not support a finding of an independent
expectation of privacy.' The Robbins plurality, however, rejected
distinctions based on the nature of a seized container. 60 As a result,
when a container is located within a car, the warrant requirement
for container searches and the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement conflict.
Although the Robbins plurality did not expressly decide the
issue, the automobile exception apparently will continue to permit
warrantless searches of the car's closed compartments. The Rob-
bins Court did not question the constitutionality of the search of
the defendant's luggage compartment." Instead, the Court held
that the automobile exception, which grants police the authority to
open a closed compartment, does not permit warrantless searches
of closed opaque containers found inside.62 Relying on United
56. Id. at 51.
57. Id. at 52.
58. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 366 (glove compartment); Texas
v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (per curiam) (passenger compartment); Cady v. Dombrow-
ski, 413 U.S. at 437 (trunk); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 44 (concealed compartment
under the dashboard).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 114(2d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684,
687-88 (9th Cir. 1980).
60. 453 U.S. at 425-27.




States v. Chadwick s and Arkansas v. Sanders," the Robbins plu-
rality stated that these "cases- [make it] clear ...that a closed
piece of luggage found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally
protected to the same extent as are closed pieces of luggage found
anywhere else."' 5 But fourth amendment protection from warrant-
less searches applies not only to luggage, but also to all closed con-
tainers. Accordingly, the Robbins plurality established its second
"bright line" rule restricting the automobile exception. Police of-
ficers now must obtain a warrant before searching any closed
opaque container seized from an automobile. 6
This restriction of the automobile exception has doubtful
precedential value because a majority of the Court does not sup-
port it. In separate dissenting opinions, Justices Blackmun,67
Rehnquist,60 and Stevens69 explicitly rejected this rule. Each of
these Justices would hold that a warrant is not required to seize
and search any personal property found during a lawful search of
an automobile, including property in a closed container.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell found merit in the
dissenters' position.70 He stated that resolving the case by ex-
panding the automobile exception might enable the Court to form
a majority.71 This result also would be consistent with Chadwick
and Sanders, because neither case involved the automobile excep-
tion. 2 In both cases, law enforcement officials had probable cause
to search the seized containers before they were placed in a vehi-
cle. The rationale behind these cases was that an officer's duty to
obtain a warrant could not be avoided by the simple expedient of
waiting until a container came in contact with a car.7" Unlike the
plurality, Justice Powell veiwed Robbins as just another container
case 7 and disapproved of the plurality's "bright line" rule. Noting
63. 433 U.S. 1 (1977); see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
64. 442 U.S. 753 (1979); see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
65. 453 U.S. at 425.
66. See id. at 428-29. The opinion goes beyond the facts of the case: "We affirm today
that [a closed, opaque] container may not be opened without a warrant, even if it is found
during the course of the lawful search of an automobile." Id. at 428.
67. Id. at 436 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 437 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. Id. The plurality relied on both Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) and
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) in formulating its decision.
73. 453 U.S. at 446 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring).
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that the parties had not litigated the automobile exception, the
Justice remarked that "it is [too] late in the Term for us to under-
take sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines.
'75
The hypothetical majority that Justice Powell contemplated
would have to include Chief Justice Burger, who concurred without
opinion in the Robbins decision. The Chief Justice has insisted
that neither Chadwick nor Sanders involved the automobile excep-
tion. In writing the Chadwick opinion, he stated that "[t]he Gov-
ernment does not contend that the footlocker's brief contact with
Chadwick's car makes this an automobile search . . . .- In his
concurring opinion in Sanders, he explained his unwillingness to
join the majority: "I. . .cannot join its unnecessarily broad opin-
ion, which seems to treat this case as if it involved the 'automobile'
exception to the warrant requirement. It is not such a case."'7 Bur-
ger reasoned that the focus of the search in Sanders was on a par-
ticular piece of luggage, coincidentally located in an automobile at
the time of the search, rather than on the automobile itself. He
proceeded to clarify this distinction:
This case simply does not present the question of whether a
warant is required before opening luggage when the police have
probable cause to believe contraband is located somewhere in
the vehicle, but when they do not know whether, for example, it
is inside a piece of luggage in the trunk, in the glove compart-
ment, or concealed in some part of the car's structure.78
Although the Chief Justice does not state whether opening luggage
in this situation should require a warrant, his opinion indicates a
reluctance to restrict the automobile exception unnecessarily.
Robbins will severely restrict the automobile exception and
place an unjustifiable burden on police officers. 9 While conducting
a warrantless search under the automobile exception, an officer will
often find closed containers inside the car. Under the plurality's
second "bright line" rule, the officer may not open these contain-
ers. Instead, the officer must seize the containers and leave his
75. Id. at 435-36. The issue, whether the automobile exception permits a warrantless
search of a container located in a vehicle was raised only in the United States Government's
amicus curiae brief. 453 U.S. at 425.
76. 433 U.S. at 11.
77. 442 U.S. at 766 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
78. Id. at 767 (emphasis in original).
79. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 436 (Black-




other duties to obtain a search warrant, which a magistrate will
undoubtedly issue in situations like Robbins.80
The Court may eventually reject this rule and allow police to
conduct warrantless searches'of containers found during an auto-
mobile search. When the issue is squarely before the Court, the
Chief Justice may join Justices Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
Stevens in a majority applying the automobile exception as a spe-
cific limitation on the warrant requirement for container searches.
This would require limiting Robbins to its facts or overruling the
case to the extent that it restricts the automobile exception." The
Court could justify expanding the automobile exception by reason-
ing that an individual's expectation of privacy in a container which
he places within a car is not significantly greater than the privacy
he associates with a locked trunk or glove compartment.8 2 Thus,
when the police have probable cause to search a container taken
from a car, it is debatable whether holding the container until they
can obtain a warrant is a lesser intrusion on a person's expectation
of privacy than an immediate search.83
V. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION
The facts of Robbins and Belton illustrate that probable cause
to search a car and probable cause to arrest its occupant often oc-
cur simultaneously.8 4  Although Robbins prohibits warrantless
searches of containers lawfully seized from an automobile, the Bel-
ton Court held that the police may search the entire passenger
compartment of a car and any containers found inside as an inci-
80. Id. at 436 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81. Three considerations make this result extremely likely. First, the Belton Court indi-
cated that its decision was based on the search incident to arrest exception, avoiding the
need to address the application of the automobile exception. 453 U.S. at 462 n.6. The literal
language of Robbins would prevent all warrantless searches of containers found in
automobiles. See supra note 66. This would severely limit the utility of the automobile ex-
ception. Second, Justice Stewart, who wrote both the Robbins and Belton opinions, has re-
signed from the Court. Third, the Court granted certiorari in United States v. Ross, 655
F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981), to decide what contain-
ers can be searched without a warrant under the automobile exception. See infra notes 147-
56 and accompanying text..
82. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 769 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
84. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 446-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ste-
vens believed that probable cause to search the defendant's car in Belton existed after the
officers smelled marijuana smoke in the car. The plurality's assumption in Robbins that a
similar fact pattern provided the police with probable cause to search the car supported his
conclusion. Id. at 451 & n.13.
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dent to the arrest of the car's occupant."5
Arrests create two exigent circumstances that make it imprac-
tical for an officer to obtain a search warrant."' First, the officer
needs to discover any weapons that the arrested person could use
to resist the arrest. Second, the officer must discover any evidence
that the suspect could destroy or conceal.87 To achieve these objec-
tives, the Court traditionally has permitted an officer to examine
the contents of a closed container seized from a defendant during a
search incident to arrest.88 But the exigency justifying this war-
rantless search dissipates when the arrest is completed. 89 The
Court therefore has held that warrantless searches incident to ar-
rest are unconstitutional when police officers conduct the search
after the articles are in their exclusive control. 0
The Belton Court rejected the concept of the officer's "exclu-
sive control" as a meaningful standard for determining whether
the search of a container was incident to the arrest.91 Under that
theory, all warrantless searches incident to arrest would be invalid
because the officer must always have the article under his exclusive
control in order to search it.9" The Court's new rule would require
that the search be a "contemporaneous incident" of the arrest."s
Two factors delineate the scope of the search incident to ar-
rest: (1) the search of the person arrested; and (2) the search of the
area within the arrestee's control." The Supreme Court has
treated these two factors differently; reviewing them separately
will reveal the implications of Belton's new "bright line" rule.
85. 453 U.S. at 460-61.
86. Id. at 457.
87. Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
88. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at
457; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959).
89. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 457-58.
90. United States v. Chadtvick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (f977). Although the Chadwick opinion
states that the exigency of the situation ends when the "property to be searched comes
under the exclusive dominion of police," the search in Chadwick took place more than an
hour after his arrest. Id. at 14-15.
91. 453 U.S. at 461 n.5.
92. Id.
93. This requirement is entirely consistent with the older requirement that the search
must be substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and conducted in the immediate
vicinity of the arrest. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 14-15; Shipley v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 818, 819 (1969); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). But see United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 810
(1974).
94. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
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For well over sixty years, the Supreme Court has recognized
the authority to search a person incident to arrest."5 The Court has
often referred to it in dicta as an affirmative right to search, rather
than as an exception to the warrant requirement.9 6 United States
v. Robinson9 7 was the first Supreme Court case to consider the va-
lidity of a warrantless search of a person incident to a legal arrest.
In Robinson an officer had probable cause to arrest Robinson for
driving with a revoked operator's license. The officer patted down
Robinson's outer garments and felt an unidentifiable object in a
coat pocket. After removing a crumpled cigarette pack and, believ-
ing it did not contain cigarettes, the officer opened it and found
several heroin capsules.98 Robinson argued that the officer should
have conducted only a limited frisk to discover weapons or con-
cealed evidence of a crime. The Supreme Court rejected this argu-
ment and held that a full search of an individual incident to a law-
ful custodial arrest is reasonable under the fourth amendment. 99
The Robinson Court did not find a need for ad hoc justifications of
these searches, explaining:
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial
arrest ... does not depend on what a court may later decide
was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons
or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the sus-
pect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intru-
sion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no ad-
ditional justification. 00
Thus, the Robinson Court abandoned case-by-case adjudication in
favor of a "bright line" rule.101 As Justice Powell explained, "an
individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no signif-
icant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person. 1 02
The Supreme Court has had difficulty defining the area within
95. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
96. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
at 392; see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964).
97. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). The Supreme Court addressed the question of a search inci-
dent to an illegal arrest in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
98. 414 U.S. at 220-23.
99. Id. at 227.
100. Id. at 235.
101. For a general discussion of the implications of the "bright line" rule established in
Robinson, see LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures":
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 127.
102. 414 U.S. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring).
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a person's control that may be searched incident to arrest. In Har-
ris v. United States, the Court held that the warrantless search of
a four-room apartment was constitutional as a search of the area
under the control of the arrested occupant.10 3 Following the same
reasoning, the Court in United States v. Rabinowitz upheld the
warrantless search of a one-room office incident to the occupant's
arrest.104 But in Chimel v. California,0 5 the Court excluded evi-
dence obtained during a warrantless search of an entire house,
overruled Harris and Rabinowitz, and held that such extensive
warrantless searches were unreasonable under the fourth
amendment. 1ioe
The Chimel Court recognized that these unrestricted searches
could result in abusive police tactics: "[O]ne result of decisions
such as Rabinowitz and Harris is to give law enforcement officials
the opportunity to engage in searches not justified by probable
cause, by the simple expedient of arranging to arrest suspects at
home rather than elsewhere."'' 0 The Court defined the permissible
standard for a warrantless search incident to arrest as the area
within the arrestee's immediate control. This is the area in which
an arrestee can reach a weapon or destroy evidence.10 8 The Court
did not delineate the exact boundaries of the area within a sus-
pect's immediate control, but concluded that "[tihere is no compa-
rable justification. . . for routinely searching any room other than
that in which an arrest occurs-or, for that matter, for searching
through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in
that room itself."09
United States courts of appeals have had difficulty defining
the area within the arrestee's immediate control, particularly when
officers have searched the interior of a car no longer occupied by
the arrestee. Although some courts have held these searches consti-
tutional," 0 other courts have not."' Because an important function
103. 331 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1947).
104. 339 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1950).
105. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
106. Id. at 763, 768.
107. Id. at 767.
108. Id. at 763.
109. Id.
110. E.g., United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); United States v.
Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973).
111. E.g., United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1980).
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of the fourth amendment is to regulate police conduct," 2 the Bel-
ton Court recognized the need for a "bright line" rule that officers
could easily understand and apply.11
The Belton Court, interpreting Chimel's definition of the area
within the arrestee's immediate control, held that a police officer
may search the passenger compartment of an automobile incident
to the lawful custodial arrest of its occupant. The Court stated
that the passenger compartment was a "relatively narrow" area
from which an arrestee could reach weapons or evidence. " " The
majority also relied on Robinson to justify a policeman's search of
the contents of any container found in the passenger compartment,
reasoning that "if the passenger compartment is within the reach
of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach."1
Belton is not, however, truly analogous to Robinson. When an
officer arrests a person, there is a continuing risk that the arrestee
can reach a weapon or destroy evidence concealed on his person. "
That risk is nonexistent in a routine search of a car's passenger
compartment. Once the arrestee is removed from the automobile,
any weapons concealed in the car cannot endanger the officer. Fur-
ther, the arrestee cannot return to the car to destroy evidence. Un-
less the officer has probable cause to believe that the car contains
evidence of a crime, he has no justification for searching it. 1"7
The Belton holding allows searches that unjustifiably invade a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy. It presumably autho-
rizes the search of a car's passenger compartment even if the arres-
tee is handcuffed and in a patrol car.118 This "bright line" rule also
invites abusive police tactics. For example, if an officer has proba-
ble cause to arrest someone, he may justify a warrantless search of
an automobile's passenger compartment and its contents by delay-
ing the arrest until the passenger enters the car.119 Other fourth
112. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudi-
cation" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REV.
127, 141.
113. 453 U.S. at 460.
114. Id.
115. Id. The Court concluded that Belton was lawfully arrested and that his jacket was
within his "area of immediate control." Id. at 462. The Court did not consider whether
Belton could actually reach the jacket.
116. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35.
117. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 466-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 472
(White, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. This is the same problem that the court attempted to avoid by overruling Harris
and Rabinowitz. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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amendment violations arise when an officer uses minor traffic vio-
lations as a pretext for searching a container in the passenger com-
partment without a warrant.2 0
The Belton Court's "bright line" rule frequently will be easier
for police officers to apply than the "area of immediate control"
test. In some situations, however, the rule may prove to be ambigu-
ous. For example, the distinction between a vehicle's passenger
compartment and trunk is not readily apparent in station wagons,
hatchbacks, buses, and vans. 2' The Belton "bright line" rule does
not guide police officers when they search one of these vehicles
without a warrant, but instead invites confusion by failing to rec-
ognize the owner's legitimate expectations of privacy.
VI. THE "BRIGHT LINE" RULES
In accomplishing its goal of providing "bright line" rules that
police can apply easily, the Supreme Court has restricted the auto-
mobile exception and expanded the scope of the search incident to
arrest exception. 22 When the police have probable cause both to
search a car and to arrest its occupant, the expanded search inci-
dent to arrest exception, rather than the restricted automobile ex-
ception, now justifies a search of the car's entire passenger com-
partment and any containers found there. In some respects,
however, the automobile exception can accommodate the legiti-
mate needs of law enforcement officers better than the search inci-
dent to arrest exception. Only the automobile exception authorizes
the police to open a car's trunk.2 8 Furthermore, a search incident
120. In most jurisdictions officers have discretion in determining whether to issue a
citation or arrest a driver for minor traffic violations. See United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting). If an officer stops a car for a traffic violation and sees
a container in the car that he wants to search, he can exercise his discretion and arrest the
driver. An officer who wants to search a particular car, but lacks probable cause, can simply
follow the car until the driver commits a minor traffic violation and search it incident to
arrest. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 450-51 nn.11-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
LaFave, supra note 101, at 152-55.
121. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan states that the Court's
new rule will not end litigation over the permissible scope of the search incident to arrest. In
addition to the doubtful distinction between the passenger compartment and the trunk of a
car, he questions exactly how long after an arrest the police may conduct a search under the
"contemporaneous" requirement and concludes that the issue will be the subject of future
litigation. Brennan also queries whether probable cause to arrest must occur before the oc-
cupant leaves his car. Id.
122. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. See id., 453 U.S. at 428-29; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); United
States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Chapman, 474 F.2d 300
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to an arrest must be contemporaneous with the arrest, but the au-
tomobile exception authorizes the police to seize a car, take it to
the police station, and search it there.12 4 These differences are rea-
sonable because the automobile exception, unlike the search inci-
dent to arrest exception, requires probable cause that the automo-
bile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. 125
When probable cause to search the car and probable cause to
arrest its occupants do not exist simultaneously, the restricted au-
tomobile exception can produce unreasonable results. If an officer
has probable cause to search a container in a car, but does not
have probable cause to arrest its occupant, then he must seize the
container and obtain a search warrant from a magistrate. 12' The
car's occupant must choose between consenting to the search or
having the police deprive him of his possessions while the officer
obtains a warrant.
1 27
On the other hand, when there is probable cause only to arrest
the occupants, the officers may search incident to the arrest any
containers located in the passenger compartment. The police can-
not justify opening the discovered containers by the need to secure
weapons or destructible evidence that possibly may be inside.
Seizure of the containers accomplishes these objectives. ' Delaying
the search while the officer attempts to obtain a warrant will not
(5th Cir. 1973).
124. Compare Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (under automobile exception
police could permissibly conduct subsequent warrantless search of car at station house) with
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (although police could have searched car inci-
dent to its occupants' arrest, subsequent warrantless search was invalid as too remote in
time and place).
125. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 447-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 432 (Powell, J., concurring). Robbins would be decided the same way
even if there were no arrest because the search incident to arrest exception was not before
the Court. Id. Police often have probable cause to make an investigatory stop of a vehicle
and search for evidence of a crime before they have probable cause to arrest the driver. See,
e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); United States v. Payne, 555 F.2d 475 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Stricklin, 534 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 831
(1976).
127. As a result, courts will constantly be required to determine if the consent was truly
voluntary. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Officers are likely to
use the threat of obtaining a warrant and detaining the person and his property in an at-
tempt to obtain consent. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1199 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc)
(Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981); see Comment, Consent to
Search in Response to Police Threats to Seek or to Obtain a Search Warrant: Some Alter-
natives, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 163 (1980); Comment, Drug Trafficking at Air-
ports-The Judicial Response, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 91, 108 n.112 (1981).
128. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 466-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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inconvenience the arrestee because he is in police custody. Fur-
thermore, a neutral magistrate will reject the'officer's petition for a
search warrant when there is no probable cause to believe that the
container holds contraband or evidence of a crime.12 9
This surprising result can be explained. In Robbins the Court
reasoned that an automobile occupant has a high expectation of
privacy in the contents of a closed opaque container. No matter
how great the probable cause to search, the expectation of privacy
remains and a warrantless search is per se unreasonable. 80 Yet, the
moment a car's occupant is subjected to a lawful custodial arrest,
the Court's reasoning in Belton implies that he has no significant
expectation of privacy in his person or in the contents of any con-
tainers located in his car's passenger compartment. Because a
search incident to an arrest does not invade any legitimate expec-
tation of privacy, the search becomes reasonable by definition.
Therefore, a magistrate's determination of the reasonableness of
the search becomes unnecessary. 8 '
The Court is effectively telling the police that if they want to
search a container located in a car's passenger compartment, they
must first arrest the car's occupant. This is likely to promote pre-
text arrests."' A rule that fosters these police tactics undermines
the very rights the fourth amendment is intended to protect.
Although one can reconcile the Court's new rules, they impair
the legitimate needs of law enforcement officers and permit the un-
justifiable invasion of an individual's legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy. In his dissent in Robbins, Justice Stevens correctly reasoned
that the Court should have upheld the searches in Robbins and
Belton under the automobile exception. 88 Under this exception, an
individual's expectation of privacy in the contents of a paper bag
or a suitcase cannot be invaded unless the police have probable
cause to search the car in which it is located."3 "
129. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. 453 U.S. at 420; see Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
131. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973).
132. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting); LaFave,
supra note 101, at 150-55.
133. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 447 (Stevens, J., dissenting)..
134. Id. at 451-52.
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VII. THE RECONSIDERATION BEGINS
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in United States v.
Ross,135 indicating that it is already beginning to reconsider the
rules established in Robbins. In Ross a reliable informant told a
police officer that Ross was selling narcotics and keeping drugs in
the trunk of his car.'3 The informant told the officer where Ross's
car was located, and gave the officer a description of both Ross and
the car. Several officers went to the location and saw Ross driving
his car. They stopped the car and ordered Ross to step out of the
vehicle.1 37 After arresting and handcuffing Ross, the officers opened
the trunk of the car and found a folded, but untaped, paper bag
and a zippered leather pouch. One of the officers opened the paper
bag and discovered glassine envelopes containing heroin.13 8 Leav-
ing the paper bag and leather pouch in the trunk, the officers drove
Ross's car to the police station where they opened the leather
pouch and discovered $3,200 in cash.'3 9
The trial court denied Ross's motion to suppress the heroin
and the cash, and the jury convicted him of possession with the
intent to distribute narcotics. " °0 On appeal, a divided panel of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that although
the search of the leather pouch was unconstitutional, the fourth
amendment did not prevent the police from opening the lawfully
seized paper bag without a warrant.14 ' The panel decision was va-
cated, and at the rehearing en banc, the government conceded that
the leather pouch was indistinguishable from the type of luggage
that the Supreme Court, in Arkansas v. Sanders,"' held free from
a search without a warrant."3 The government argued, however,
that Sanders did not forbid the warrantless search of the paper
bag.'" The District of Columbia Circuit rejected this argument
and held that the warrantless search of the paper bag was uncon-
135. 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981).
136. Id. at 1162.
137. Id.
138. Id. Although the officers searched Ross's paper bag contemporaneously with his
arrest, the government did not contend that the search was incident to arrest. Id. at 1168-
69.
139. Id. at 1162.
140. Id.
141. United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. at 15-16 n.6 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 1980),
rev'd, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.) (rehearing en banc), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981).
142. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
143. 655 F.2d at 1161 & n.3.
144. Id. at 1161, 1166.
1981]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
stitutional. The court applied the rule established in Sanders to
prevent the warrantless search of both the paper bag and the
leather pouch.14 5 The court reasoned that Sanders did not estab-
lish a "worthy container" test that would determine the validity of
warrantless searches according to the type of container searched.1"6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v.
Ross1 4 7 to decide whether the warrantless search of the paper bag
was constitutional. The Court has instructed the parties to argue
whether it should reconsider Robbins." Ross will provide the
Court with an opportunity to decide whether the nature of a
container determines the validity of a warrantless search of that
container. In contrast to Robbins, Ross will also provide the Court
with an opportunity to settle the issue whether the automobile ex-
ception affects the warrant requirement for container searches.
The Supreme Court in Ross probably will uphold the search of
Ross's paper bag, although the Court's precise holding is difficult
to predict. A majority of the Justices believe that the nature of a
container does not affect the validity of a warrantless search.1 49 A
possible majority of the Court believes that the automobile excep-
tion should allow the warrantless search of at least some containers
located in a car.160 These two majorities do not, however, consist of
the same Justices.61 Justice Stewart's recent resignation from the
145. Id. at 1170-71.
146. Id. at 1161, 1170-71. The District of Columbia Circuit stated that if different types
of containers and various methods of closure were the decisive factors for assessing the va-
lidity of a warrantless search, the police would be required to make fine distinctions in de-
termining whether to proceed with a search. Had Ross sealed, rather than folded the paper
bag, a court might have held that the police needed a warrant to search it. Id. Further,
under this theory, a paper bag might not be subject to a warrantless search if it were found
among suitcases. Id. at 1170 n.28. Ross's paper bag was discovered alongside a leather pouch
which the government later conceded was analogous to luggage. Id. at 1168, 1170 n.8. It is
unclear whether a single, luggage-like, adjacent container would protect a paper bag from a
warrantless search or whether the bag would remain vulnerable unless surrounded by sev-
eral pieces of luggage. Id. at 1170 n.8.
147. 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981).
148. Id.
149. This majority includes Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall, who joined the
Robbins plurality, and Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Stevens, who dissented in Rob-
bins. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
150. This hypothetical majority would include Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, Blackmun,
and possibly Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell. See supra notes 67-78 and accompa-
nying text.
151. Only Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Stevens have expressed the belief that
the automobile exception should permit the warrantless search of a car and any containers
found inside. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. The desirability of avoiding a
."worthy container" test is likely to enable these Justices to find support for their position
among the other members of the Court.
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Court, and Justice O'Connor's recent appointment, make the final
outcome of Ross even more uncertain.
In deciding Ross, the Court should hold that when the police
have probable cause to stop and search a car, they may conduct a
warrantless search of the entire car and any containers found in-
side."6 2 The police officers in Ross indisputably had probable cause
to believe that contraband was located in the trunk of Ross's car." '
This probable cause, combined with the diminished expectation of
privacy commonly associated with automobiles, gave the officers
authority to open Ross's trunk.'" The same considerations should
justify the officers' warrantless search of the containers found in-
side Ross's car. This holding would be in accordance with the nu-
merous United States courts of appeals cases decided before the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Chadwick.15 5 Before
Chadwick the circuit courts routinely held that the automobile ex-
ception authorized both the warrantless search of a car and any
containers found inside.'"
6
In establishing the automobile exception as a limitation on the
warrant requirement for container searches, the Court would not
be compelled to overrule Chadwick, Sanders, or Robbins. Neither
Chadwick nor Sanders were automobile exception cases. 5 7 As Jus-
tice Stevens has noted, when the police have probable cause to
search a container and an opportunity to seize it, they cannot jus-
152. The Court may also decide that the automobile exception applies because the fo-
cus of the search in Ross was on the car rather than on a particular container. Chief Justice
Burger advocated this distinction in his concurring opinion in Sanders. See supra notes 77-
78 and accompanying text. It is difficult, however, to find a logical rationale for this distinc-
tion. If applied in Ross, the search of the paper bag would be upheld because the informant
stated only that Ross was keeping narcotics in the trunk of his car. Alternatively, if the
informant had told the officer that Ross was keeping the narcotics in a paper bag located in
the trunk, the warrantless search would be invalid because the officer would have had to
obtain a warrant before searching the bag. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d at 1201
(Wilkey, J., dissenting).
153. 655 F.2d at 1168 & n.22.
154. Id. at 1169.
155. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1104-05 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 832 (1975); United States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 916 (1975); United States v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147, 149-50 (5th Cir. 1974) (en
banc), aff'd mem. sub nom. United States v. Aviles, 535 F.2d 658 (1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Evans, 481 F.2d 990, 993-95 (9th Cir. 1973). Many courts
decided these cases without even considering whether the search of a container located in a
car presented an issue different than the search of the car itself. See, e.g., United States v.
Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Garner, 451 F.2d 167 (6th Cir.
1971).
157. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
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tify a warrantless search under the automobile exception by wait-
ing until someone places the container into a car.1" Because the
Robbins plurality relied on Chadwick and Sanders, and did not
consider the automobile exception, the Court could interpret Rob-
bins as having held only that closed opaque containers may not be
searched without a warrant.159
Allowing the warrantless searches of all containers under the
automobile exception would preserve the Court's policy of creating
"bright line" rules that both the courts and the police can easily
understand and apply. In future cases, parties would litigate only
two issues concerning the warrantless search of a container located
in a car: First, did the officer have probable cause to search the
car? Second, did the officer have probable cause to search and an
opportunity to seize the container before it was placed in the car?
Because both the police and the courts are accustomed to evaluat-
ing probable cause, these issues may be easily addressed. When at-
tempting to justify a warrantless search of a container found in a
car, an officer will simply explain when he had the first opportu-
nity and probable cause to seize the container.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Reinstating the automobile exception as a specific limitation
to the warrant requirement for container searches will promote le-
gitimate needs of law enforcement officers. It will also reduce the
need for expanding the search incident to arrest exception as a
substitute for the restricted automobile exception. Therefore, the
Court should reconsider the Belton decision.
Restricting Belton, however, will have to wait until the injus-
tices resulting from Belton's "bright line" rule are before the
Court. When those injustices arise, the Court should hold that
when the driver of an automobile is arrested and there is no proba-
ble cause to search his car, any warrantless search incident to ar-
rest should be strictly limited to preventing the suspect from se-
158. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 446-47 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra
note 72 and accompanying text.
At times the police might find it advantageous to keep a closed container under surveil-
lance in order to acquire evidence against additional suspects. See United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1974). This rule
would not prohibit the police from maintaining the surveillance and seizing the containers
when, in their judgment, it was most appropriate. Instead, it would merely require that
when the police delay seizing a container, they must obtain a warrant before searching it.
See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
159. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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curing a weapon or destroying evidence. Rather than routinely
searching a car in the absence of probable cause, the police can
usually accomplish these objectives by removing the occupant from
the car. Limiting the application of Belton would reestablish a mo-
torist's legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his car.
By reinstating the automobile exception and limiting the
search incident to arrest exception, the Court would hold fast to
"established principles" for defining exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement. These limited exceptions would more adequately strike
the necessary balance between society's need for effective law en-
forcement and an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy.
